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‘AUTOMATION IN SOCIAL SECURITY:  




Tribunals and their membership are no island insulated from the incoming tsunami 
tides on the technological sea.  Information technology, and specifically artificial 
intelligence(‘AI’), is just the most recent technological advance to wash up on tribunal 
shores:  AI is the 21st century’s equivalent of the 1961 IBM golf ball electric typewriter, 
or the Osborne laptop of 1982. 
Merits review is or will be impacted by AI in two main ways.  First, in changing 
the way disputes present themselves for adjudication (changing their ‘decisional 
character’ and their ‘evidentiary form’).  Second, in altering the way tribunals ‘hear’ and 
‘decide’ those disputes.  In social security the first has long been present, though 
recently has become more complicated;1 while the second — as for other Australian 
tribunals — lies in the future, if perhaps a nearer future than many may appreciate. 
As is obvious, then, AI embraces everything from its initial hints in the electric 
typewriter, through mere ‘digitisation’ (ie computerisation of records) and current use 
of algorithmic (but merely automated) expert system decision-making, on to its 
emergent and precocious ‘newest kid on the block’ — ‘machine-learning’ algorithms 
and big data-sets, able to ‘best’ and thus replace human decision-makers.  In social 
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security, digitisation of records ramped up around a decade ago; this was when the 
paper records of claims, Centrelink letters or other documents were transferred to or 
created as computer records.  Paper records were kept only to meet proof of identity 
and the needs of dinosaurs like the courts (eg for fraud prosecutions).  Or (for a time) to 
service merits review bodies.2  As robo-debt illustrates, automated algorithmic decision-
making, drawing on long-standing provisions deeming the outcomes to be a ‘decision’ 
for review purposes, is now operating on a large scale in some Centrelink settings (over 
half a million robo-debts raised since mid-2016).  Machine learning properly so-called, 
however, currently remains largely in the design or pilot stage (Carney 2019a).   
Merits review by the now Social Services and Child Support Division of the AAT 
(‘AAT1’; previously the SSAT, pre-amalgamation) has long had to grapple with review 
applications which present as an often very brief and sketchy authorised review 
officer’s reasons for decision, supported by reams of what look like ‘computer print 
outs’— looking this way because that is exactly what they are.  Under neoliberal 
governance pressure of fiscal starvation, the AAT1 and its predecessor have almost 
completely abandoned multi-member panels, compressed hearing times, and increased 
the numbers of oral decisions (Carney and Bigby 2018); but to date AAT1 has not 
embraced either ADR in social security (due partly to legislative limitations3) or online 
dispute handling.   
The principal driver of adoption of AI, whether in decision-making or in merits 
review processes, is of course the economic efficiency principle (eg, Palmgren 2018: 19-
20).  Thus Centrelink’s online compliance initiative (‘OCI’, popularly known as robo-
debt) is projected to yield massive savings (up to $3.7 billion over budget out-years) by 
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capturing the 93% of ATO supposed data-match discrepancies4 previously not 
personally investigated by Centrelink officers because it was uneconomic to do so 
(further, Carney 2018a: 10).  For its part, online dispute resolution is portrayed as not 
only more efficient but also as a major boon in widening access to justice (Palmgren 
2018: 18-19, Cortes 2018), just as oral decisions are touted as promoting greater 
participation in or respect for the justice of outcomes.  Yet there are always other actual 
or supposed objectives and benefits in play, which may out rank efficiency.  Rigorous 
independent policy accounting of all such factors, however, has been neglected to date.   
As discussed below, these social policy assessments of net outcomes are more 
complex and nuanced than mere superficial consideration of one or a few goals.  For 
instance, discrimination against citizens who are technology poor is evident in many 
settings.  It is seen in Centrelink’s OCI robo-debts in the inability of some citizens to 
find and upload documents, in their lack of or unreliable technology and web 
connections, and in more subtle ‘lock-in deflection’ of citizens from appreciating the 
existence of or having the stamina to then utilise independent review avenues.  And it is 
serious concern in online dispute resolution (Wing 2017).   
Vulnerabilities for social security recipients include but of course are not limited 
to these issues of lack of tech confidence, or on-line stamina (Carney 2018b).  Some of 
the issues and challenges in both of these fields will now be outlined in turn.    
II ONLINE CHANGES TO THE CHARACTER OF REVIEW MATTERS 
Online administration is a deliberately compendious term, intended to capture the 
variety of ways AI can impact what I earlier called the ‘decisional character’ or 
‘evidentiary form’ of the matters presenting for merits review. 
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income derived from total earnings of all employment, against the accuracy or otherwise of the fortnight 
by fortnight actual earnings as reported by the person as the basis for their legal rate entitlement.  Further, 
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A. Computational ‘jargon in’ equals computational ‘jargon out’? 
For decades the bulk of the information in Centrelink ‘files’ has been presented in 
digital form, such as ADEX or Multi-Cal rate and debt calculation records; as the raw 
unformatted input fields used to generate actual Centrelink correspondence (but not the 
letter itself); and as ‘file notes’ keyed to screen, often using shorthand codes for events 
and transactions.  The AAT now receives all these papers electronically (including the 
review officer’s decision statement), printing off paper copies of them for despatch to 
the applicant and the tribunal member in advance of the hearing.  These are a 
challenging read, even when Centrelink has put the print-outs into chronological order 
and grouped the material (eg by putting all letters, and all debt calculations together).   
Establishing whether a person had received sufficiently full information in a 
letter about, say, a rate reduction now being challenged beyond the elapse of the 
automatic arrears correction period,5 always involved establishing the date of the 
advice letter and the actual words of advice generated to determine if it is sufficiently 
fulsome at law.6  Locating this information within the morass of verbiage and codes 
now is particularly challenging; it is ‘buried-away’ in unformatted data strings, since no 
formatted copy of the actual letter is stored or provided (though of course Centrelink 
could readily produce one by re-running the input information).  File notes likewise not 
infrequently present not as a record just for each opening date of the record ‘segments’ 
appearing on the page, but with easily overlooked later annotations tucked away within 
each of these text blocks (calling for very close scrutiny to establish accurate event time 
lines).  Tucked away in this material may be broader textual observations, crucial to 
understanding earlier or later events, or corroborating the version of events being 
advanced by an applicant.   
                                                 
5  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 ss 109(1) [unlimited arrears if no adequate ‘notice’], 109(2) 
[arrears of up to 13 weeks if challenged within that period of receipt of notice, otherwise only from date 
of correction].   
6  The requirements to constitute adequate notice are set out in cases such as Secretary, Department of 
Family & Community Services v Rogers [2000] FCA 1447 Cooper J at paras [33]-[34]; Austin v Secretary, 
Department of Family and Community Services [1999] FCA 938, (1999) 92 FCR 138. 
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Some AAT1 members dispense with the AAT registry’s paper print-off of file 
documents at hearings.  Instead they bring only their tablet or laptop and rely on pdf 
‘tagging’ and colour highlighting of the electronic-file forwarded to the tribunal.  I 
remain unpersuaded of the justice or wisdom of this however.  Too often in the course 
of a hearing a comment would be made that jogged my memory of something I’d 
marked in my papers and was then able to locate manually while talking to the 
applicant.  This enabled me to introduce that information into the conversation for 
confirmation or otherwise.  This is simply not possible by scrolling through what not 
uncommonly may be several hundred pages or more ‘on screen’ (a thousand or so 
pages in some cases).   
AI initiatives such as fully electronic hearing papers, then, would come at a cost 
to the quality of justice. 
B. Contextual features matter? 
The evidentiary form of presentation of a merits review issue to AAT1 is indeed shaped 
by AI (as later explained) but regard must always be had to the other factors at play 
within the overall procedural and decisional context.   
The history of social security merits review offers a classic example here.  To 
channel Donald Rumsfeld on his ‘unknown unknowns’, the operational structure of the 
predecessor tribunal to AAT1 (the Social Security Appeals Tribunal ‘SSAT’) in the 
decades before being readied for amalgamation, enabled it routinely to discover such 
unknowables.  For example that Centrelink had mistakenly recorded a client’s required 
advice of their income in the wrong place (eg under family payments rather than the 
working age payment to which it actually related; now an impossibility because FTB 
papers would no longer be provided to AAT1).  This was do-able because the SSAT for 
most of its life received all the file papers, not just those deemed relevant to the decision 
by Centrelink; and because it also had access to the Centrelink mainframe computer 
(helped further by members or support staff with knowledge of its multiple acronym 
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codes and processes7).  That was all lost when mainframe access was cut off and only 
the section 37 ‘T document‘ papers forwarded, consistent with AAT processes in its 
other jurisdictions.  In the result, the former SSAT’s more extensive practical powers of 
inquisitorial inquiry were diminished in the interests of AAT uniformity and 
independence from the agency being reviewed.  No longer can unknown unknowns be 
detected on review.  Absolute purity of principle has its price. 
Shifting to an AI context likewise changes the evidentiary form of the way issues 
present.  For instance AI generated decisions may lack the ‘explainability’ quality (of 
giving reasons).  Retention of this quality is insisted on under EU law, but it is not 
guaranteed elsewhere (Olsen et al. 2019).8  The most pertinent of contemporary 
examples of this within Centrelink is its development of a number of smart-phone app 
interfaces.  These apps deliver information about payments, downloadable letters, 
advice about future appointments, and enable recipients to upload any required 
documents or information.9  The undoubted convenience and other benefits of such 
technology for the many, nevertheless comes at a cost.  It comes at the price of blurring 
the way ‘decisions’ are made (now made ‘virtually’ in response to data flows) and 
changes the very geography of governance of clients — shifting its location from being 
transacted at or in contact with a Centrelink office, into the ‘virtual’ space (Sleep and 
                                                 
7  The Callinan Report regrettably demonstrated little understanding of the skill set required of 
competent AAT members, or of their legitimate support needs from staff at and under member direction; 
instead opting for what I may term a ‘judicial’ model where a monopoly of legally qualified members 
would decide everything on a more adversarial than inquisitorial basis:  Callinan, n 3, paras 1.8 [measure 
6], 8.20, 10.34. 
8  This is not the place to rehearse the major differences between Australian and European macro-
level models of accountability for administrative action, beyond noting that investing principally in 
administrative courts in many EU countries elevates the importance of having reasons against which 
legality can be tested, while Australia’s administrative review on the merits (stepping into the shoes of 
the primary decision-maker) renders reasons otiose:  further, Michael Asimow, ‘Five Models of 
Administrative Adjudication.’ (2015) 63(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 3-31.  
9  This, rather than say Centrelink failures to comply with protocols for what should be contained 
in reasons for the decision under review, remains most pertinent because AAT review is de novo and 
even if no or the wrong lines of reasoning are deployed, the decision generates its own ‘presumed’ 
grounding in the correct sub-set of reasoning possibilities. 
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Tranter 2017: 506).  They also raise other challenges to traditional protections of rights of 
citizens (Henman 2019).10 
Another case in point is the ParentsNext (‘PN’) program for sole parents at risk 
of long-term dependence.  This was piloted in 2016 and rolled out nationwide in July 
2018 at the same time as a revamped Targeted Compliance Framework (‘TCF’) for all 
working age social security recipients.  PN targets clients in receipt of Parenting 
Payment for more than six months without receiving income from employment and 
with a child under 6 years.  The reformed TCF now commendably fosters compliance 
mainly by suspending and then restoring payments with back-pay on compliance, 
reserving actual rate reductions or non-payment periods for those few ‘wilfully’ doing 
the wrong thing.  However both PN and TCF have heavily embraced digital (e.g. smart-
phone) technology.  Smart phones are the preferred mode of contact for reporting 
compliance (to be notified ‘on the day’) and communicating a person’s compliance 
status (a ‘traffic light’ system for alerting being at risk of or in actual breach status).  
Associated with this, under their contract for service provision, the operational 
responsibility for coding the acceptability11 or otherwise of reasons for non-compliance 
has been shifted entirely to the job matching agencies.  Moreover, rather than being in 
the hands of skilled agency caseworkers (or passed on to a Centrelink delegate with a 
provider recommendation) the task is entrusted to front-desk clerical staff.  This is 
because it is now ‘constructed’ as a checklist exercise against a list of standard excuses.  
It is further compounded by default rules allocating clients onto digital reporting 
without adequate assessment of their digital literacy or capacity to comply (giving rise 
to a state-generated liability to fail to comply).   
                                                 
10  See for example, Paul Henman, ‘Of Algorithms, Apps and Advice: Digital social policy and 
service delivery.’ (2019) 12(1) Journal of Asian Public Policy 71 at 74-75 [‘street-level’ bureaucracy becomes 
‘screen-level’ bureaucracy], 76-77 [some fundamental provisions of accountability were transformed 
under robo-debt]. 
11  The ultimate legal responsibility for determining acceptability of an excuse for a ‘mutual 
obligation’ or a ‘work refusal’ failure (as participation events are now labelled) remains that of a 
Centrelink delegate and is incapable to being delegated to an outside body: Social Security (Administration) 
Act 1999 ss 42AI [reasonable excuse], 42AJ [excuses must pre-date the activity requirement unless there 
are reasonable grounds for not doing so].   
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This all poses a host of new challenges for clients and AAT members (in deciding 
whether subsequent sanctions should be upheld or otherwise).  For clients there is the 
anxiety and loss of confidence in review processes due to their inability formally to 
challenge notifications of the ‘default points’12 building towards the trigger points for 
suspension or loss of payment.  For tribunal members there are the difficulties of 
ascertaining whether document uploads or compliance notices and activities failed for 
technical reasons such as a drop-out, or were not ever actually initiated in the first place 
(generally, Casey 2019). 
C. The powers and procedures of the tribunal matter 
Of course the overall array of legislative powers within the review system design also 
has some part to play in accommodating the additional ‘adjudication complexities’ 
around AI, as now sketched.   
Automated decisionmaking is fully legitimised in social security, unlike the 
NDIS where automated ‘casework’ decisions would be much more problematic (for 
elaboration, Carney et al. 2019).  It is legitimised in social security by ‘deeming’ 
computerised decisions to be reviewable ‘decisions’, just as is the case for those 
involving human input.13  AAT review powers when dealing with rate and debt 
decisions fortuitously however are ample ones.  It was the challenge of performing very 
                                                 
12  Unreviewable because the points in isolation do not result in an ‘operable’ decision but instead 
are simply steps along the path towards one, and thus have not matured to the stage of becoming a 
reviewable ‘decision’ as defined in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321. 
13  This has been the case since 2001, though in 1999 general authority was given to make or record a 
decision by computer, and from 1989 to that date, to ‘record’ it by computer: Will Bateman, ‘Automatic 
Public Law.’ a paper presented at “Public Law Weekend” — Centre for International and Public Law, 
ANU, Canberra, 3 November 2018.  Equivalent provisions of the Social Security Act 1991 covering 
automatic rate adjustment or cancellation decisions existed earlier, such as s 75A:  
75A If:  
(a) a person is receiving an age pension on the basis of data in a computer; and  
(b) the pension is automatically terminated or the pension rate is automatically reduced by the 
operation of a provision of this Act; and  
(c) the automatic termination or reduction is given effect to by the operation of a computer 
program approved by the Secretary stopping payment or reducing the rate of payment of the 
pension;  
there is taken to be a decision by the Secretary that the automatic termination or rate reduction 
provision applies to the person’s pension.   
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complex rate calculations (a product of a highly targeted system of payments) which led 
to empowering the AAT either itself to ‘assess’ a rate of payment when one is 
overturned, or to direct Centrelink to do so.14  This proved necessary even though we 
deliberately rewrote the Social Security Act in 1991 so that, for the first time, it became 
possible for very patient citizens to calculate their rate of payment by following the 
‘steps’ of the relevant rate calculators.  Anyone familiar with the complexity of the 
reams of pages of Multi-Cal ‘long form’ rate calculations would understand why 
referral back to Centrelink is virtually always chosen by the tribunal.  Absent this 
power, cases involving a rate determination quite simply would have become 
impossibly hard for the AAT to resolve.   
In short, the powers and procedures with which the adjudicative tribunal is 
furnished are a critical component of its capacity to accommodate complexity such as 
that introduced by AI.  
D. Machine learning is a different order challenge?  
The largest challenge however is surely the one looming on the horizon:  that of 
machine learning.   
This is not the place for a definitive analysis of the benefits and potential 
difficulty posed by machine learning algorithms.  Algorithms characterised both by 
their ability to replicate complex human decision-making and then adaptively to ‘learn’ 
how to do even better.  A ‘besting’ of human systems not only on cost and reliability but 
also on ‘quality’, thus making their rapid adoption inevitable.  So the task is to ensure 
machine learning is well designed (as robo-debt demonstrably was not, even though 
only a simple automation system) including its compliance with principles of legality, 
transparency and procedural fairness; and by rendering its decisions capable of review.  
Transparency of decision-making is of course critical to both of these objectives.  Yet it is 
very challenging to achieve (Williams 2018: 4).   
                                                 
14  Now Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 s 177(a)(b) [previously s 149(2)(3) of that Act but 
originally Social Security Act 1991 s 1253(2)(a)(b)].   
10 
 
The EU (and thus presently the UK) applies the solution of requiring citizens to 
be advised when the decision lacks any human element and to have the right to request 
a human decision for a period of time after being advised of this (Veale and Brass 2019: 
19).  However this may prove to be an empty protection because, it has astutely been 
suggested, the human being will often simply defer to and confirm the complex 
computer-made outcome (Olsen et al. 2019: 4).  Susan Morse for her part places store in 
hastening slowly.  She speculates that, when unable to offer full transparency or 
confidence, governments will adopt a ‘precautionary’ approach of undershooting the 
potential legal mandate, confining machine learning to the ‘safe’ zones (Morse 2019).  
Surely a somewhat heroic assumption for Australia, given the unchecked robo-debt 
experience driven by maximising revenue yields (Carney 2019b).   
Yet it is also important to remain grounded, and not attribute magical differences 
to machine learning (however mathematically complicated the weightings and 
algorithms) as compared to human decisions.  As Olsen and colleagues recently so 
pithily put it, ‘we argue that the inner workings of an algorithm is not what is in need of 
explanation, but rather, the human interaction with the output of the algorithm’ (Olsen 
et al. 2019: 10).  In an Australian merits review context, this boils down to whether the 
person understands the basis for the decision and the information taken into account in 
making it.   
III ONLINE JUSTICE CHALLENGES 
The previous section has identified a number of significant implications of AI regarding 
the ability of merits review, and tribunal members, to do ‘justice’ to applicants and 
themselves.  However the ‘digital’ if not the ‘virtual’ tribunal may not be far away in 
merits review, given a recent spate of interest in and experimentation with online 
dispute resolution ('ODR'; further, Cashman and Ginnivan 2019).   
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In September 2018, VCAT engaged a firm called MODRON15 to run a small one 
month pilot of online dispute resolution of small claims,16 with a view to a possible full 
roll-out in 2022 (Hendry 2018, Cashman and Ginnivan 2019: 42-43).  Two months later, 
Churchill Fellow Katarina Palmgren’s study report recommended, among other things, 
that Victoria ‘[e]stablish [an] online court as a division of the Magistrates’ Court of 
Victoria with the jurisdiction to deal with low value civil claims up to $10,000’ 
(Palmgren 2018: 51, rec 2).  As Palmgren reports, British Columbia Canada has a fully 
integrated online Civil Resolution Tribunal (further, Salter 2017, Cashman and 
Ginnivan 2019: 43-44),17 while similar but bolder proposals have been made for the UK 
(Palmgren 2018: 9) including the English, Civil Money Claims Online (Cortes 2018: 105, 
113-118), along with other initiatives globally (Cashman and Ginnivan 2019: 43-47).  
Although ODR presently shrinks or attenuates rather than completely replaces the role 
of human adjudicators (such as by channeling parties into AI assisted self-managed 
settlements or conciliations or supplementing human adjudication), the shift away from 
human oversight is both very real (Sourdin 2018) and is ‘trending’ under the press for 
fiscal savings.   
One of the many other choices in designing ODR is between court-oriented (ie 
parallel with paper-based adjudication) as in the Dutch Rechtwijzer for family divorce 
disputes (Smith 2018), and an ‘integrated’ or mainstreamed model as in BC Canada (as 
favoured by Palmgren).  One of the bugbears with parallel systems is working out the 
gate-keeping between the electronic and the traditional pathways, with concerns 
expressed about too few (or even too many) entering the online justice arm.  Volume of 
business of course is a very crude measure that conceals the value stance of the 
                                                 
15  See https://www.modron.com/solutions_courts_tribunals.  
16  VCAT’s summary of the pilot reported: ‘65 cases using the technology, with 71 parties 
participating in online hearings and 21 cases settled beforehand, an indirect result of online dispute 
resolution case management showing that online dispute resolution is a fast, cost-effective option for 
people with civil disputes at VCAT’: https://www.vcat.vic.gov.au/news/sharing-vcats-online-dispute-
resolution-experience.  





evaluator.  For example the Dutch opt-in scheme was said to have drawn ‘too few’ 
customers, an outcome put down to the available options being too blunt and the time 
for deciding whether to opt in too pressured.  But it surely is a concern if too many of 
the more vulnerable citizens opt into on-line justice systems lacking the presence of a 
face-to-face hearing to detect indicators of distress, lack of comprehension of 
proceedings, or other cues of inadequate participation.  Mandating online justice 
options as standard parts of the process, as under an integrated model, certainly deals 
with caseload volume concerns, but it does not necessarily tackle such arguably much 
more important compositional equity concerns in the caseloads, or the many other justice 
system values in play (for a thorough review, Cashman and Ginnivan 2019: 47-61).18   
Of course similar compositional equity issues already crop up with the use of 
oral decisions or other more traditional procedural variations to hearings.  Variations 
likewise often driven by neoliberal governance policies leaving the machinery of justice 
inadequately funded.  For better or worse, these measures at least remain firmly in the 
hands of tribunal members rather than left to choices made by potentially vulnerable 
applicants themselves (as in parallel online justice) or being designed into the justice 
system (as in an integrated online justice model).  I say for better or worse because 
members are not necessarily good judges of such matters.  Prone to over-estimating 
their competence to dispense the same quality of analysis and reasoning when 
delivering ex tempore decisions compared to putting themselves to the discipline of 
writing (and the reflection that this entails).  Or under-estimating the conscious or 
unconscious temptation to simply let self-interest dictate the picking of the less onerous 
option.  So once again the policy balances are more complicated and nuanced than is 
obvious on a more superficial consideration, whether we are looking at the rather 
‘luddite’ present or the more technologically ‘utopian’ future.  Addressing these 
challenges of ODR futures will test us all, but they cannot be avoided.  For otherwise it 
                                                 
18  Administrative justice goals and values include ‘openness, confidentiality, transparency, secrecy, 
fairness, efficiency, accountability, consistency, participation, rationality, equity and equal treatment’, as 
well as human rights, discrimination, proportionality and ‘manageability’: Ibid, 11-12.  
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is surely true that ’[w]ithout international standards, monitoring and global, cross-
jurisdictional regulation of ODR, [risks] the software designer becoming a gatekeeper 
for access to justice’ (Wing 2017: 19).   
Yet in taking responsibility for ODR design rather than letting software designers 
set the values and principles, it is important not to over egg either present arrangements 
or their futurist technological alternative.  Both are policy options.  Both have merits 
and deficiencies.  Nearly 70 years ago Alan Turing proposed pitting purely human and 
purely AI decision-making (and by implication decision review) to a blind face off.  A 
blind face off before a jury of human beings who, without knowing which decision path 
was which, would assess the quality and acceptability of outcomes of the human and 
the AI processes.  Without formalising this test (as intriguingly is proposed by Olsen, 
2019: 25-26), we should at least adopt this as one key benchmark.  As Cashman and 
Ginnivan (2019: 61) demonstrate, for all their attraction of speed, cheapness, efficiency 
and user satisfaction, ‘[I]n the design and implementation of such platforms, important 
objectives in terms of access to justice, open justice and procedural fairness need to be 
accommodated’.  
IV CONCLUSION 
Leah Wing rightly notes, ‘[t]he ways in which we design ODR systems and manage 
data within them are central to whether they magnify the risk or the opportunities for 
access to justice’ (Wing 2017: 17).  I have made the same point about AI, including 
sophisticated machine learning algorithms, within social security administration 
(Carney 2019b).  In one sense it is trite to say that sound design is the difference 
between acceptable and unacceptable uses.  Robo-debt for instance surely would not 
have been so problematic had it been designed in accordance with the principles laid 
down by the Administrative Review Council in 2004 (Administrative Review Council 
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2004),19 or had that oversight body not been ‘unlawfully’ purportedly wound up, as 
Callinan found (2018/19: para 1.27). 
However social security is rather special in one important way.  Citizens subject 
to primary decision-making by Centrelink (whether by human hand or by AI) and 
those aggrieved clients who turn to the AAT for merits review, are disproportionately 
comprised of vulnerable individuals, whether due to age, location, human capital 
resources, mental illness, education, or other markers (Carney 2018b).  That is why very 
particular attention needs to be paid to avoiding discrimination either in primary 
decision-making or on review.  Attention that is of course equally required in other 
settings where vulnerable client populations are served by review, including consumer 
claims, adult guardianship and mental health, to name but three.    
In doing so, we need to be mindful of some wider or longer term issues, 
including that AI ultimately sings from a different, more didactic song sheet to the more 
discretionary justice administered by human beings.  So although social security law 
has already lost much of its discretionary flexibility, a ‘slower burn’ risk remains.  This 
is the risk that over time ‘[c]omputerisation is apt to change the nature of an administrative 
process, translating public administration from a person-based service to a dehumanised 
system where expert systems replace officials and routine cases are handled without 
human input.’ (Harlow and Rawlings 2019: 19-20 [my emphasis]).  There is also a 
synergistic risk.  The phenomenon where AI decisions and ODR tribunals come to 
constitute a mutually reinforcing adaptive spiral, slowly ousting any vestiges of more 
equitable adjudication associated with traditional pathways (further, Re and Solow-
Niederman 2019: 5).   
                                                 
19  If followed there would have been no doubt about the legality of all debts raised.  It would have 
resulted in a two stage process, where data matches led to the perfectly reasonable invitation for alleged 
debtors to upload or otherwise provide fortnightly pay slips or bank records.  But when unavailable or 
not provided for whatever reason, under stage two Centrelink would have continued to bear the legal 
responsibility of obtaining fortnightly data (using its powers to require employers or other institutions to 
do so) essential to meeting its onus of proof obligation. 
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However all this is already well in the wind.  What is canvassed in this paper are 
some of the ways of further augmenting already disturbing winds of cultural change 
blowing through the AAT (Lucy 2017), including the way ADR and other initiatives 
may deteriorate rather than improve the quality of decision-making or distort access to 
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